Abstract: This article argues that better informed insights into the benefits and repercussions of the form of development of East Asian economies could be obtained when the theoretical perspectives from two different bodies of literature are employed collectively. If the concepts from the discipline of political economy, specifically the body of literature dealing with the developmental state now commonly deployed in analyses of East Asian economies, is used in combination with concepts from the literature on business history based on the work of Alfred Chandler, the reasons for the rise and fall of major enterprises in East Asia can be better understood. A case study of enterprise and economic development in Malaysia is presented to substantiate this argument.
1
This study argues that in order to appreciably improve analyses from the developmental state perspective, it is necessary to consider applying concepts from another body of literature, that of business history, specifically those based on the work of Alfred Chandler (1962; Chandler et al., 1997) . These two sets of literature have never been employed in conjunction with each other. And yet, as this article will show, the collective application of the concepts in these two bodies of literature is crucial for securing a proper understanding of economic and enterprise development in East Asia in general, and in Malaysia in particular.
A defining characteristic of the developmental state is the high degree of state intervention in the economy, exemplified through terms such as "governed markets" (Wade, 1990) , "governed interdependence" (Weiss and Hobson, 1995) and "embedded autonomy" (Evans, 1995) . One of the core concerns of the developmental state literature is state-business collusion, with the government identified as playing an important role in steering resources to private firms in order to attain its development goals. Johnson (1982) , the original proponent of the concept of the developmental state, points out that while all governments intervene in their economies, there are fundamental differences in the manner in which the East Asian states have done so. The unique features of the East Asian development state economies include an autonomous political-bureaucratic elite, public-private co-operation for a common goal determined by a state planning agency and a strong emphasis on investing in education to ensure a supply of well-trained labour (Johnson, 1982; Woo-Cumings, 1999 ). Scholars of this school point out other mechanisms deployed by the government, such as its "marketleading strategy" (Wade, 1990 ) and its allowing of firms to "get the prices wrong" (Amsden, 1989) , to encourage profit-concerned entrepreneurs to venture into specific economic sectors deemed important for industrialisation.
While the analytical focus of the developmental state school is principally on economic sectors and the state, Chandler's stress on business history involves an exhaustive assessment of the organisational and managerial structure and development of a firm, dating back to its moment of incorporation. Chandler's fundamental concern was with how and when change occurred within a firm, and he adopted the concept of "organisational capabilities" to help us understand why cumulative learning within an enterprise had or had not taken place (Chandler, 1990) . His work drew attention to the need for the firm to focus on vertical integration in its production process, but also noted periods when diversification of its business activities might become necessary, as such factors could determine its progress or demise. In Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, Chandler emphasised this issue when he attributed the decline of big business to its failure to invest sufficiently in three key areas: manufacturing, marketing and management (Chandler, 1990 ). 2 In The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, Chandler (1977) employed the concept of "administrative coordination" to indicate the growing professionalisation of a company's management to avoid institutional failure, a crucial factor that explains the dynamism of firms, but an issue inadequately emphasised in the developmental state literature. Here, he noted how as managerial hierarchies got more embedded into an enterprise, professional control structures became separate from ownership. Other theoretical literature on enterprise development, in the Chandlerian tradition, emphasise in greater depth how transitions in business ownership and control patterns can have a monumental bearing on the development of a company (see, for example, Penrose 1980) . 3 Briefly, the stages of enterprise evolution in this literature are: Stage 1: partnerships; Stage 2: single owner/family business; and Stage 3: managerial control. In most cases, the transition period from a partnership (Stage 1) to a family-owned enterprise or single ownership (Stage 2), is quite rapid, usually occurring within a number of years after the creation of a company. The transition from Stage 2 to managerial control (Stage 3), would normally involve generational change, sometimes over two generations (Chandler, 1962 (Chandler, , 1977 Penrose, 1980) . While there is a focus on ownership and control patterns within the developmental state literature, there has been little attempt to determine the effect of these changes over a protracted period.
Chandler's form of analysis in The Visible Hand, through a review of the evolution of managerial form, from a family-owned enterprise to a professionally-managed firm, draws attention to another major point. His study revealed that the growth of modern industry was not primarily due to the quality of a company's management and its access to capital, but to its capacity to upgrade its technology for mass production and to enhance its ability to distribute its products widely. To achieve both objectives, managers inevitably had to look internally, at a firm's organisational structure, to rectify or introduce new mechanisms to augment innovation and increase market share of its products (Chandler, 1977) .
In a subsequent study on the scale and scope of a firm, Chandler would further develop this argument in comparative perspective, by assessing different forms of managerial capitalism in the industrialised West, that is in Britain (personal), the US (competitive) and Germany (co-operative), to determine how resources secured by a large, hierarchical, multidivisional enterprise are developed (Chandler, 1990 ). Chandler noted that firms and markets evolve together, though arguing that business organisation can shape markets in the industrial sector. 4 Thus, the Chandlerian perspective allows for insights into how economic and enterprise expansion is determined by internal organisation. The developmental state literature provides few tools for this form of analysis. And while the latter does impart valuable insights about how state-generated concessions, or rents, can transform markets and advance the development of new technologies, it does not demonstrate sufficiently well why some firms have been able to exploit these privileges more productively than others.
There are, however, aspects of Chandler's work that if employed in isolation would not be helpful in analysing economic and enterprise development in East Asia. While Chandler's aim was to assess the reasons for the rise of big business and its competitive advantage, which he attributed to its capacity to learn and develop technology, other studies have applied this perspective to argue that small firms can similarly shape the form of the industrial sector. In the mid-1980s, a number of major studies critiqued the necessity for the state to encourage the growth of large-size industrial firms. Prias (1976) argued that in the case of Britain, economies of scale were not dependent on firm size, but on plant size. Prias further contended that although the number of companies controlled by some companies had grown significantly, the average plant size in these firms had decreased, by half in some cases, leading to massive unemployment. Put differently, industrial concentration was not a prerequisite for productive efficiency, nor would it necessarily generate employment (Prias, 1976) . Piore and Sable (1984) provided further evidence to substantiate this point, based on the example of small-scale industries developed in continental Europe, arguing that small firms were capable of being more responsive to market needs as they were far more flexible and better equipped for engendering and adopting innovations. 5 In this regard, one criticism of Chandler's work was that he did not focus enough on developments "on the shop floor." As Galambos (2003: 24) notes, "economies of scale and scope did not enable U.S. firms to hold their market shares when they failed to achieve innovation from the bottom up as well as the top down" (for a critique of Chandler see Amatori and Jones, 2003) .
In the developmental state literature, it is argued that some East Asian governments have recognised the importance of the small firm in terms of promoting innovation and generating employment, a point particularly well noted in studies of Taiwan's industrial capacity (see Wade, 1990; Fields, 1995) . In Singapore, after a long cultivation of state-owned companies, there has been much emphasis on supporting small-and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) as a means to promote entrepreneurial capacity (Chew, 1988) .
Another area where Chandler's mode of analysis fundamentally differs from the organising ideas within the developmental state literature is that his assessment of the conduct of business does not offer an appraisal of the politics of a government or of the role of the state in encouraging enterprise development, a decision intentionally taken to focus attention only on managerial forms among the various large companies. In the developmental state model, decisions determining how state-generated resources are distributed are not always made with the aim of promoting an economic sector or developing domestic enterprise. Literature on the political economy of East Asia is replete with studies revealing that rents distributed by the state have often been determined by factors such as political expediency (Pempel, 1999 ; see also Gomez ed. [2002] on "political business"). Furthermore, the historical relationship between the state and capital in East Asia is one that has been fraught with friction (see Amsden, 1989; Chan and Ng, 2004; Gomez, 1999) . This hostility between state and capital was, in part, rooted in the fact that political and economic power was held by different groups (see Yoshihara, 1988) . The pattern of power distribution and the consequence of power shifts, due to political struggles, can have serious repercussions for the ownership and control of domestic firms. What is therefore required is an analysis of the political and economic context in which the firm exists, to help offer insights into the conditions which it has to operate in and adapt to in order to continue to accumulate and ascend in the corporate sector.
In the case of Malaysia, for a comprehensive understanding of enterprise development, there are two reasons to avail ourselves of both bodies of literature. First, although the focus of this study is on large-scale enterprises, there is a need to note the varieties of capital that exist, that is of small-and medium-scale industries, state-owned companies, multinational corporations and micro-enterprises, specifically those operating informally. An assessment of large-scale enterprises, as well as of other forms of capital, from the perspective of one body of literature would provide insufficient insights into their organisational and technological development. Second, and importantly, the development of the Malaysian economy and domestic capital was profoundly influenced by a number of quite different state policies.
The government's subscription to policies under the developmental state model, particularly during the more than two decade of Mahathir Mohamad's premiership , has contributed to Malaysia's fairly rapid economic development. State-led development, replicating post-war Japan's form of economic growth, was imperative for Mahathir in order to support domestic enterprises and encourage the rise of large business groups. His desire to develop huge conglomerates was strongly influenced by East Asian corporate models, specifically the Japanese zaibatsu and South Korean chaebol, with their emphasis on the close links between the financial and industrial sectors to advance industrialisation. Mahathir had used these models as templates while promoting the creation of large, internationally-recognised Malaysian conglomerates that would also help rapidly industrialise the economy. 6 Mahathir's vision of economic and enterprise development for Malaysia was, however, just as inspired by another model of development vastly different from the developmental state, that is the American liberal, free market system, with its strong emphasis on wealth accumulation and the promotion of the private sector as the primary engine of growth. The US model encouraged private over public enterprise, exposure to competition, universal-type policies that would privilege the fittest and most equipped, and an open economy with minimal state intervention in the belief that these factors would engender efficient employment of resources. In this model, the government's principal role is to ensure law and order and macroeconomic stability (e.g. low inflation, stable exchange rate, and so on) and offer incentives to facilitate local and foreign investments. The government has to create a well-developed infrastructure and ensure proper transportation systems, such as roads, port facilities and communications systems. The government was not to try to influence relative prices or the allocation of resources. Mahathir was particularly influenced by neo-liberalism whose espoused economic doctrines included limiting state intervention in the economy and the endorsement of privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation. Essentially, neo-liberalism advocated "small government" and the virtues of allowing the private sector to drive economic growth (Harvey, 2005: 19-31) . By subscribing to the main tenets of neo-liberalism, the Malaysian government actively encouraged the aggressive participation of foreign companies in its economy, which were to become one of the key drivers of industrial growth. Moreover, as much as Mahathir was inspired by the role of Japan's developmental state he appeared above all enamoured with the stock market, an instrument which he felt had been effectively fostered by businesspeople in the US to rapidly create huge firms (Gomez, 1999) . Mahathir was also probably aware that Japan, unlike the US, had not been a stock-market centred economy. The active deployment of privatisation and the stock market, pivotal features of a neo-liberal state, to cultivate big business had an immense impact on the pattern of development of publicly-listed companies in Malaysia, necessitating the tools provided by Chandler to assess why some of them functioned well in this system while others fell away, sometimes quite rapidly.
The implementation of both the developmental state and neo-liberal models was profoundly influenced by another major policy introduced by the government in 1970, the New Economic Policy (NEP). One aspect of the NEP, involving affirmative action, was the need to target an elite group within the business community as recipients of state-created rents to promote the rise of Malay-owned conglomerates. This form of targeting, which was to have a major bearing on the shape of capital formation and development, was introduced to rectify inequities in corporate ownership and control patterns that had emerged during British colonial rule (Mehmet, 1986) . The NEP entailed partial abandonment of laissez-faire economic management in favour of greater state intervention. During the first decade of the NEP, this form of intervention was characterised by the active participation of state-owned enterprises in the corporate sector. From the early 1980s, however, the government began to selectively promote the interests of private individuals, usually well-connected Malays, as a means to create a new breed of capitalists. This style of selective patronage involved privatisation of state-owned enterprises created or developed during the early NEP years. While this form of selective patronage was very much within the mode advocated by a developmental state, where Chandler becomes important is when the need arises to assess the pattern of growth of these preferentially-treated firms. One important outcome of selective patronage was that while Malay capitalists who had received rents from the state floundered, Chinese businesspeople similarly privy to government concessions have thrived, with some emerging as owners of conglomerates. This outcome has been used by some scholars to argue that Chinese culture and intra-ethnic cohesion were factors that have contributed to the continued ubiquitous presence of their businesses in the Malaysian economy and their apparent economic influence in East Asia (Lever-Tracy, et al., 1996; Yeung and Olds, 2000).
There is another basis for considering these two schools of thought together in a study of corporate Malaysia. The operations of large-scale quoted enterprises, on the one hand, have been deeply influenced and conditioned by government developmental models, as well as the politics of the state. On the other hand, the rise and fall of large firms was attributable to their ownership structure, that is if they were partnerships, family-owned firms or under single ownership. The longevity of an enterprise was also determined by its pattern of growth, that is if the owner had adopted a diversified, horizontal or vertical style of development. These factors had a major bearing on the sustainability of different types of large business groups, including those owned or controlled by the state, well-connected businessmen and families. An assessment of the evolution of these companies requires different forms of analysis, as they reflect different ownership and control patterns. Moreover, these large enterprises were affected differently by government policies and not all of them were privy to state patronage.
A final issue to consider is that although the ideas on which the developmental state and neo-liberalism are built appear on opposite ends of the policy spectrum, both models have deeply influenced policy-planning in Malaysia. The tenets of the developmental state and of neo-liberalism were not, however, applied in their full form, showing how selective the state has been when planning and implementing policy. 7 Importantly in the Malaysian context, one common feature in both models was the close nexus between state and capital, ostensibly to promote domestic enterprise, even though neo-liberalism involved reducing or even removing government intervention in the economy. This common feature offers insights into the conduct of political power in the development of corporate Malaysia. One reason the Malaysian government, which was intent on promoting Malay capital through state intervention, was comfortable with neo-liberal ideas was that policies under this model allowed the government to distribute rents to the well-connected, including firms controlled by the United Malays' National Organization (UMNO), the hegemonic partner in the ruling Barisan Nasional (National Front) coalition. Although it appeared that through privatisation and liberalisation, the state was removing itself from the economy, UMNO leaders were able to retain much control over the corporate sector by selectively distributing rents. UMNO, with its apparently arms-length relationship with the corporate sector, could now deny being a major actor in corporate manoeuvres that benefited the party and businessmen aligned to the state. UMNO's need to be seen to have an impartial relationship with capital was imperative because, by the mid-1980s, the party had to deal with public criticisms of conflictof-interest, patronage and corruption. Such criticisms, hurled primarily at members of a kitchen cabinet created by Mahathir, would eventually come to be made by senior party leaders, contributing to serious factional disputes that culminated twice, in 1988 and 1998, in the rise of new opposition parties led by UMNO stalwarts (Gomez, 1990 (Gomez, , 1994 (Gomez, , 2006 .
Privatisation, industrialisation and the promotion of Malay-owned conglomerates, reveals both fierce opposition within the state (and UMNO) and the reasons for the symbios of very different policies. An important feature of Malaysia's political economy under Mahathir was the growing concentration of power in the office of the executive, which came to be known as "Mahathirism" (Khoo, 1995). Mahathir was willing to experiment with economic models as he saw value in neo-liberalism, the developmental state and affirmative action, which he adapted to pursue his development vision. The conduct of the business of firms, specifically of big business, provides insights into the outcome of the government's mix of policies from these different development models.
To explain the outcomes of the varieties of policies adopted by the Malaysian state to promote economic and enterprise development, this study deals with two questions: (a) what has been the impact of this mix of development and redistribution policies on the corporate sector, specifically big business?; and (b) why have large publicly-listed firms not been able to sustain their position as a major enterprise in the corporate sector over a protracted period?
To assess the impact of these policies on corporate Malaysia, this study will evaluate the nature and evolution of capital during key periods: between Independence and that epochal moment when racial riots occurred in 1969, which led to a major change in economic development policy orientation with the introduction of the NEP; between 1970 and 1981, when the NEP, involving extensive state intervention in the economy, was implemented; and between 1982 and 2003, when the Malaysian economy under Mahathir was subjected to three seemingly contradictory policies of the developmental state, neo-liberalism and affirmative action. To assess the impact of these policies on publicly-listed companies over the past half century, an evaluation will be provided of the top 20 enterprises during these defining moments. The study concludes with a discussion on the impact of the different policies on the corporate sector.
1957-1969: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO RACE RIOTS
Two important features stand out about the nature of business groups in Malaysia. First, Malaysia's corporate history abounds with cases of partnerships from which business groups have emerged (see Hara, 1993; Searle, 1999; Gomez, 1999) . And second, the diversified pattern of growth of their firms has been a popular corporate strategy since the colonial period. Chinese immigrants diversified into any field of business that held out the prospect of high returns. Businesspeople from other ethnic groups replicated this style of enterprise development well into the present period.
When the Chinese migrated to Malaya during the pre-colonial and colonial periods, they formed intra-ethnic business partnerships. New migrants saw common ethnicity as a tool they could exploit to help them cope with their new environment. Once acclimatised, however, they no longer had the same need (Chan and Chiang, 1994 During British colonial rule, Malay involvement in the emerging capitalist economy was not encouraged. The British preferred that the Malays remained in food production, primarily fish and rice. When Malay peasants tried to venture into modern commercial sectors, such as rubber production, the British blocked them by imposing restrictive cultivation conditions on land (Lim, 1977) . These early discriminatory policies in favour of British plantation interests severely limited the potential development of indigenous capital and shackled Malays to low income economic activities. This colonial British impediment to the development of Malay capital became a justification for post-1969 policies that positively discriminated in favour of Malays.
Research on Chinese enterprise has shown that, in family firms, kinship ties were crucial in raising funds to get these enterprises incorporated and functioning (Gomez, 1999; . The original characteristics of the firm suggest that kinship ties were an important consideration when people were hired and when funds were required to get the enterprise into operation, though control remained in the hands of the founder and key family members. In terms of management style, the role of family members in the enterprise was crucial. These contentions support stereotypical arguments about the weight of kinship ties within Chinese family firms (see, for example, Redding, 1990; and Whitley, 1992) ; but other studies contend that these links were vital only during the incorporation of the enterprise (Gomez, 1999; Gomez and Hsiao, 2004) . As these firms established themselves in the economy, the reliance on kinship ties diminished appreciably.
Moreover, the succession, division, dismantling or takeover of major family firms are topics that have drawn little notice in studies of Chinese enterprise. Yet, examples of the disintegration of family firms and of feuds among descendants of leading Chinese entrepreneurs are legion. These feuds encompass reputable firms including the Aw family's Haw Par group and the Yeo family's Yeo Hap Seng (YHS) group. 10 This brings into question the sustainability of family firms, particularly when linked to the issue of generational change. Among such firms, the descendants of their founders, commencing from the second generation, may not join the enterprise, resulting in the company's closure. In other cases, feuds have emerged among members of the second or third generation. The best examples where disagreements or problems have occurred among the second generation are the Yeo family's YHS Group and the Kwek family's Hong Leong Group.
What is obvious is that the companies established by a number of the foremost businessmen of the colonial period were not sustained into the modern period. Eu Tong Sen, Lau Pak Kuan, Loke Yew, Tan Kah Kee and Lee Kong Chian all secured considerable interests in banking, tin mining and rubber plantation sectors during colonial rule. Loke Yew helped found Kwong Yik Banking Corp, the first Chinese bank to be incorporated in Malaya in 1903 and by the early 1900s was reputed to be the richest man in Malaya. Eu Tong Sen, a tin miner, founded the Lee Wah Bank. Lau Pak Khuan, also a tin miner, helped establish Chung Khiaw Bank, the Overseas Union Bank (OUB), Public Insurance Company and the Oriental Smelting Company. Tan Kah Kee, who founded an empire and lost it, was involved in the pineapple and rice business, the rubber industry and the shipping sector. Tan helped establish a Chinese newspaper, Nanyang Siang Pau, and a bank, Chinese Commercial Bank. During the depression in the early 1930s, Tan's ventures floundered, necessitating a bailout by his son-in-law Lee Kong Chian.. Among all these businessmen, Lee remained the only prominent business figure in Malaya and Singapore by the end of the 1960s. 11 Henry H.S. Lee, a tin miner, helped establish two banks, the OUB and the Development & Commercial Bank, the latter of which he passed on to his children and who lost control of it (see Gomez, 1991: 31-43) . Many of these businessmen had forged partnerships to form banks to help protect and promote their interests but none were sustained.
When these partnerships broke up, the companies came under the control of one individual or family. Partners went on to become competitors in the same sector. The best example of this is the OCBC, a merger of three banks owned by prominent businessmen that occurred in 1932 following the Depression. Shareholders and employers of OCBC would eventually breakaway, and the new enterprises to have emerged from these splits include Malayan Banking, founded by Khoo Teck Puat, Public Bank, established by Teh Hong Piow, and MUI Bank (now the Hong Leong Bank), set up by Khoo Kay Peng, all at present among Malaysia's leading banks (Gomez, 1999: 75-83) .
Among the major firms that were incorporated during the colonial period that remain influential are the enterprises closely associated with Lee Kong Chian: Lee Rubber and OCBC. Even though the Lee family retains ownership of these companies, they are professionally managed. Companies owned by the rubber magnate Tan Cheng Lock, associated with the Pacific Bank and United Malacca Rubber Estates, are similarly professionally managed. Recent evidence indicates that when a new generation takes over an enterprise, there is a professionalisation of the management and the creation of inter-ethnic business ties. Examples include the publicly-listed YTL Corp and the Hong Leong group (Gomez, 1999) .
In the colonial and immediate post-colonial periods, foreign enterprises, especially British concerns, dominated the economy (Puthucheary, 1960 ; also see Appendix 1). While Chinese capital appeared present everywhere in the economy, the extent of its ownership and control of the corporate equity was small relative to that of foreign capital. Puthucheary (1960: 131) noted that one sector in which the Chinese had a dominant presence was in manufacturing, in an assortment of activities ranging from food production to saw-milling. Most of the Chinese companies operating in this sector were small-scale enterprises. 12 Foreign participation in manufacturing was limited due to the small size of the Malayan market (Tan, 1982: 170) .
British capital's continued command over the Malayan economy after Independence was mainly due to political factors. The leaders of UMNO, the dominant party in the then ruling tripartite coalition, the Alliance, did not want to limit the influence of foreign firms for fear that the Chinese would secure control over the economy with the retreat of the British. Chinese capitalists such as Tan Cheng Lock, Lau Pak Khuan and H.S. Lee, later to become Malaya's first Finance Minister, managed to secure a strong presence in the post-colonial government through their control of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), UMNO's partner in the Alliance. 13 However, the Malay party had an unwritten accord with the British colonialist to allow its companies to retain their ownership and control over large segments of the economy. A well-connected Chinese elite continued, however, to secure rents from the state. Robert Kuok secured incentives to enter into flour and sugar production, Lim Goh Tong received a monopoly licence to run a casino and H.S. Lee, Khoo Teck Puat and Teh Hong Piow obtained approval to establish banks. Politically, the Alliance -with another race-based party, the Malayan Indian Congress, led by professionals and land-owners as the third member -was plainly a marriage of convenience, with little trust between its members. The basis of the UMNO-MCA union was that the Chinese party generously funded the Alliance's electoral campaigns in return for more seats in federal, state and municipal governments. The important federal cabinet portfolios of Finance and Trade & Industry came under the control of MCA ministers. These capitalists hoped that effective political representation in government would allow them to protect their economic interests. The MCA, however, only retained these cabinet portfolios until UMNO had consolidated its hegemony in the government, after the formation of an enlarged coalition, the Barisan Nasional, created in response to the May 1969 riots. Following Independence, the government attempted to increase Malay participation in the economy. The Rural and Industrial Development Authority, established in 1950, was reconstituted as Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA or Council of Trust for Indigenous People) in 1966 to establish and manage new industrial enterprises for later transfer to the Malays. In 1965, Bank Bumiputra was established to provide Malays with an avenue for obtaining credit for new enterprises. In 1969, a trust agency, Perbadanan Nasional (Pernas or National Corporation), was established to promote Malay capital (Gale, 1981) . But, by 1970, there had not been much change, in terms of a more equitable distribution of corporate wealth among all communities.
Lim's (1981) analysis of the top 100 quoted firms in the early 1970s revealed significant interlocking stock ownership among a small number of prominent corporate groupings, indicating concentration of control over the economy by a few large British and Chinese corporations (see Appendix 1) . Of the 100,000 shareholders in 62 large corporations, 797 owned 69% of the total RM1.4 billion of equity in these firms. The top 1% of these 797 shareholders owned 29% of this equity, while the top 50% owned 97% and the bottom 20% only 0.4% (Lim, 1981: 114). Lim (1981: 52-70) noted extensive interlocking directorships, identifying three important types of directorates: owner-directors, executive-professional directors and functional directors. Owner-directors were equity owners who served as directors. Executive-professional directors were high-ranking employees who did not own a substantial stake in the firm. Functional directors were those appointed to perform "extraeconomic functions"; these directors were typically former senior bureaucrats who could perform "advisory and brokerage functions" (Lim, 1981: 69) .
Appendix 1 provides a list of the top 100 firms, in terms of assets owned, at the end of the first historical period under review. What is noteworthy about these companies is that by 1971 most of them are not owned by leading Chinese businessmen who had emerged during the colonial period, including prominent figures such as Eu Tong Sen, Lau Pak Khuan and Loke Yew, who had all come to own a significant stake in tin mining and rubber plantations. One company that had emerged in the colonial period that retained a formidable presence in the Malayan economy was the OCBC group, a Singapore-based enterprise that was by then professionally managed. Though a partnership when formed, the OCBC group was then under the control of Lee Kong Chian and his family. Other prominent Chinese who had developed a large enterprise during colonial rule and retained control of these firms during the 1960s were Robert Kuok and Lee Loy Seng, though both businessmen were then fairly new business figures compared to Eu, Lau and Loke. Although the government had attempted to develop domestic Malay capital, more than a decade after Independence, no ethnic Malay had emerged with a significant presence in the corporate sector. In 1970, the Malay share of corporate wealth (by individuals and government trust agencies) amounted to a mere 2.4%. Chinese equity ownership stood at 27.2%, while the bulk of the remaining equity was under foreign ownership (see Appendix 2).
1970-1981: IMPLEMENTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Growing Malay discontent with the inequitable distribution of wealth among ethnic communities partly contributed to the 1969 race riots. In response to the riots, UMNO enlarged its tripartite alliance into a multi-party coalition, the Barisan Nasional, comprising more than a dozen parties. Since a number of the parties in the reconstituted ruling coalition had much Chinese support, the MCA's influence was reduced appreciably as it was no longer the sole representative of this ethnic community in government. The government introduced the NEP to promote national unity by eradicating poverty and achieving inter-ethnic economic parity between the predominantly Malay Bumiputera (or "sons of the soil") and the other ethnic communities. Even so, the government's target was 30% Malay ownership of corporate equity by 1990 was the NEP's primary objective.
The NEP originally entailed government intervention in the economy through public enterprises and trust agencies to accumulate capital on behalf of the Malays, a process Mehmet (1986) would describe as "trusteeship." Between 1971 and 1981, the presence of the state in the corporate sector increased appreciably as trust agencies and public enterprises went on an acquisition drive, aided by increased public expenditure as well as a 1975 government ruling that each quoted firm had to ensure a minimum 30% of its equity was allocated to Bumiputera agencies or individuals. Government-linked organisations usually acquired about 20 to 50% of equity in companies for investment purposes. A number of these organisations, including Khazanah Nasional, Permodalan Nasional (PNB), the Ministry of Finance Inc., Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas), the Employees Provident Fund, Lembaga Tabung Haji and Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pencen, have become major equity shareholders of what is now referred to as government-linked companies (GLCs). Mehmet (1986) would refer to the rise of these institutions as "distributional coalitions," that is cartel-like networks acting in collusion to concentrate wealth. In addition, various state governments, through their respective State Economic Development Corporations, also came to own corporate equity. Some state governments, such as those in Johor and Sarawak, are shareholders of major quoted firms through their investment arms (Gomez and Jomo, 1999) .
Chinese capital continued to grow during this period, but there was an increasing need for these businesses to accommodate the state and its policies (Gomez, 1999) . Following implementation of affirmative action, inter-ethnic relationships became common at three levels. First, among leading Chinese-owned companies, prominent Malays were appointed to boards of directors, mainly to serve as avenues for these firms to secure access to the state or bypass bureaucratic red-tape in government. These directors had equity ownership but were not actively involved in the management and development of these companies (Jesudason, 1989) . Second, at the level of the SMEs, "Ali-Baba" relationships were forged, but there was an unequal relationship here between the partners, where the Malays provided the contracts and the Chinese implemented them (see Chin, 2001 ). Third, among Malaysian elites, business partnerships were forged on a more equal basis. Notable examples include the partnership between Ibrahim Mohamad and Brian Chang in Promet, which eventually fell apart. Eric Chia worked with Mokhzani Abdul Rahim and Shamsuddin Kadir in United Motor Works (UMW). Mokhzani and Shamsuddin moved on to develop their own enterprises (Searle, 1999) . Rashid Hussain and Chua Ma Yu established Rashid Hussain Bhd (RHB), before the latter went on to develop his own business interests (Gomez, 1999) .
Although the NEP sought to reduce ethnic inequities through affirmative action, the government declared that no particular group would experience loss or feel any sense of deprivation due to the policy. According to the government, "restructuring" was to be achieved primarily through economic growth. Asset redistribution was to be undertaken through various forms: taxation, funding public enterprises and the banking system, which would provide Bumiputeras with preferential credit access and funding for the acquisition of corporate equities (Malaysia, 1971) .
These programmes, however, soon aroused non-Bumiputera dissatisfaction with the NEP, and such reservations about this policy were exacerbated when public enterprises moved into sectors in which the Chinese had a major presence, particularly in banking, property and construction. The Urban Development Authority, established in 1971, ventured into construction and property development. By 1976, two Chinese-controlled banks, Malayan Banking and the United Malayan Banking Corporation, had fallen under state control following runs on them. During the next decade, several other financial institutions established by Chinese, along with one Indian-controlled bank, the United Asian Bank, were taken over by the state or by Malays (Gomez and Jomo, 1999: 60-66) . The authorities had investigated these banks' management for alleged malpractices or violation of banking regulations, which contributed to their eventual takeover by the government, before they were divested to state agencies or to select Malays.
By the late 1970s, public enterprises had acquired controlling interests in a number of major foreign-owned firms. In 1975, Pernas acquired British-owned London Tin (now the Malaysian Mining Corporation), the country's leading tin mining group. The following year, Pernas secured a major interest in the OCBC-dominated Southeast Asian-based multinational Sime Darby. In 1981, British-owned Guthrie Corporation, the largest plantation company in Malaysia, was taken over by the trust agency PNB, which was soon to emerge as the country's largest institutional investor. Other major enterprises that came under state or Malay control included the leading shipping firm Malaysian International Shipping Corp (MISC), the auto-motor giant, UMW, and the largest newspaper company, New Straits Times Press (NSTP). With the state now actively acquiring corporate assets on behalf of the Malays, by the end of the 1970s, the Bumiputera share of corporate wealth, by individuals and government trust agencies, had increased appreciably to 12.5%. By 1980, foreign ownership of corporate equity had fallen appreciably from 63.4% in 1970 to 42.9% (see Appendix 2).
1982-2003: CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT UNDER MAHATHIR
In 1981, after Mahathir was appointed prime minister, he expressed his grand vision for Malaysia to achieve fully-developed nation status by 2020, with industrialisation driven by a new class of internationally-recognised Malay-owned enterprises, known as the "Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community" (BCIC). To achieve this vision, Mahathir moved to change the nature of Malaysia's interventionist state, reshaping it as a developmental state based on the Japanese experience, encapsulated in his "Look East" policy. His government would intervene in the market to alter the incentives available to businesses, targeting the industries it considered imperative to achieve industrialised nation status. Within the bureaucracy, Mahathir stressed the importance of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI), modelled on Japan's MITI, to drive industrialisation. As in Japan, where the MITI's "administrative guidance" was a means to determine the industrial sectors that private firms should venture into (Johnson, 1982 ), Mahathir's government would decide the direction of the economy, determining the ways the state would intervene to promote domestic industry. Since the private sector had a crucial role in this new pattern of development, Mahathir promoted "Malaysia Inc.," modelled on "Japan Inc.," to emphasise enhanced public-private co-operation (see Chee and Gomez, 1994) .
In spite of his overt focus on Japan, Mahathir appeared to be more influenced by the entrepreneurial form of the South Korean chaebols than by the innovative organisational capabilities of Japanese enterprises.
14 It can also be suggested that Mahathir's government shared many of the characteristics of the South Korean state that facilitated the promotion of the sorts of intervention he subscribed to: strong political authority, a clear national consensus for economic growth (though there was no consensus on the form of economic development) and a competent but increasingly subservient bureaucracy. Mahathir's growing personal hegemony over the state ensured that bureaucrats adopted and pursued his conception of the developmentalist model.
Mahathir's heavy industrialisation policy was implemented through the state-owned Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM), partially modelled on South Korea's Heavy and Chemical Industries. HICOM collaborated primarily with Japanese companies to develop a variety of industries, ranging from steel, iron and cement production to the manufacture of the national car, the Proton. As a part of this strategy, HICOM was required to increase local linkages, promote small and medium enterprises and generate local technological capacity, primarily with Malay-owned firms. For Mahathir, heavy industrialisation would help diversify the industrial sector. Claiming that private businesses would be reluctant to participate in heavy industries given the huge capital investments required and limited technological expertise, Mahathir bypassed the predominantly Chinesecontrolled manufacturing sector. This "ethnic bypass" policy was heavily criticised (see Jomo, 1997: 250) .
Businesses owned by William Cheng, Khoo Kay Peng and Quek Leng Chan had acquired much expertise in the steel and cement manufacturing sectors and most motor vehicle assembly and distribution firms were Chinese-owned. 15 Among the most prominent motor vehicle assemblers and distributors were Loh Boon Siew's Oriental Holdings, William Cheng's Lion Group, the Tan brothers' Tan Chong Motors and UMW, then controlled by Eric Chia. Instead of encouraging Chinese participation in its heavy industrialisation endeavour, the government negotiated with the Japanese firm Mitsubishi to establish the joint-venture Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional (Proton), with HICOM holding a controlling interest. Edaran Otomobil Nasional (EON) was established by HICOM in 1985 to handle the sale of the Proton Saga. 16 The government turned to Nippon Steel to develop its steel industry, an enterprise which was fairly quickly discarded by the Japanese firm. Control of this state-owned steel firm, Perwaja Steel, came under the management of Mahathir's close ally, Eric Chia, but it would eventually come to be mired in allegations of mismanagement (Gomez 1999 ).
In the case of Proton, when the government undermined its bargaining capacity with Mitsubishi by ignoring the contribution Chinese firms could have made to the car project, it allowed the Japanese firm to obtain better terms for itself in the Proton joint-venture. Mahathir would later acknowledge that Malaysia's interests had not been well served by this joint-venture, complaining that Mitsubishi had not transferred much new technology, while a continued dependence on Japan for parts and materials increased trade deficits (Leutert and Sudhoff, 1999) . Subsequently, another joint-venture was formed, involving Japan's Daihatsu, when Malaysia's second national car project was introduced. This joint-venture, Perusahaan Otomobil Kedua (Perodua), also included Mitsui and the local firm, UMW, by then under state control. 17 Mahathir would later encourage Malaysian firms to establish joint-ventures with European manufacturers to produce new models of the national car. One project involved France's Automobile Citroen and the publicly-listed Diversified Resources (DRB), controlled by the late Yahya Ahmad. This venture was successful enough to allow HICOM's privatisation in 1993, with Yahya gaining control, providing him with a near monopoly over the production and sale of national car models. Following a major restructuring, EON and Proton came under the control of DRB-Hicom in 1993.
As for Malay capital, after more than ten years of NEP, Mahathir argued that although the government had increased the volume of corporate equity held in the name of Bumiputeras to 12.5%, few Malays had control of large firms. For Mahathir, this had been the primary objective of affirmative action. His method to create an ensemble of dynamic, entrepreneurial Malay businesses was to be through a process of targeting and preferential treatment. Mahathir argued for the need to pick potential entrepreneurs and confer on themwithout open tender -rents such as licences, contracts and privatised projects, acquired with loans from banks owned by the government. This tripartite link between the government, private capital and financial institutions would aid the rapid rise of well-diversified conglomerates (see Sloan, 1999) .
Mahathir also considered the stock market an avenue to create domestic enterprises and to transfer wealth, even though he was probably aware that Japan, unlike the US and the UK, has not been a stock-market-centred economy (Dore, 2000: 175; Morck and Masao, 2003) . The government would create rents for selective distribution to private companies owned by a small group of businessmen who would be involved in shares-for-assets swaps and reverse takeovers in order to capture control of quoted firms. These firms would, in turn, be used for mergers, acquisitions and takeovers, to develop the size of their enterprise. As share prices escalated, their stock would be used as security to obtain more loans from banks for further acquisitions. The injection of these rents into the stock market, Bursa Malaysia, would help these businessmen swiftly develop the value of their firms as well as the size of the local bourse (Gomez, 2002: 3-4) .
Through privatisation, state assets would be sold to private individuals and GLCs which would be listed on the stock exchange. There were a number of sizeable privatisedpublic-listings including the gaming firm, Sports Toto, the national airline, Malaysia Airlines (MAS), MISC and HICOM (see Jomo, 1995 ) . By the mid-1980s, 24 state enterprises had been listed on the local stock excahnge, and by 1995, privatised former state agencies accounted for 22% of the local bourse's total market capitalisation (Callen and Reynolds, 1997: 15) . Between 1989 and 1993, equity market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP increased from 105% to 342%. By the mid-1990s, as the fourth largest bourse in Asia and the 15 th largest in the world, Bursa Malaysia's market capitalisation relative to GDP was the highest among Southeast Asian countries (Callen and Reynolds, 1997: 15) .
The enormous inflow of foreign funds as portfolio investments (FPI) and loans during the 1990s contributed appreciably to enlarging market capitalisation. Most of these funds were channelled to well-connected firms, which were progressively laden with debts but were expanding rapidly through their access to numerous state-generated rents. The attraction of FPI by well-connected firms suggested foreign investors wanted to secure quick capital gains from their investments. Foreign inflows also included heavy borrowing by some Malaysian banks and firms. Moreover, patronage involving the disbursement of loans to the wellconnected, including funds for the acquisition of shares rather than productive economic activities, became rampant as influential UMNO leaders began cultivating selected businesspeople. Among these influential politicians were Anwar Ibrahim, deputy prime minister between 1993 and 1998, and Mahathir's close ally, businessman Daim Zainuddin (Gomez, 2002: 87-90 ).
Mahathir appointed Daim as finance minister in 1984 and depended heavily on him to create privately-owned Malay conglomerates. Daim approved of Mahathir's promotion of Malay capital, but did not appear supportive of Mahathir's use of state enterprises to develop heavy industries, an opinion shared by many of his cabinet colleagues. Daim soon came to be seen as the most powerful figure in the corporate scene as his business associates rapidly secured leading privatisations. For example, in 1990, Daim's protégé, Halim Saad obtained control of a multi-billion ringgit privatised North-South highway project, and swapped it for majority ownership of Renong, a moribund but quoted firm. 18 In just five years, Renong would become the leading Malay-owned conglomerate, with a place among the top ten publicly-listed companies (see Appendix 3). Among many well-connected and quoted firms, Renong became the symbol of Mahathir's success in creating a class of Malay "new rich" through selective government patronage.
Other Malays associated with UMNO leaders received extensive political patronage, contributing to their meteoric rise as owners of a substantial portion of corporate stock. This Mahathir would subsequently voice his intolerance of those who had wasted the rents they had obtained from the state. By the early 1990s, Mahathir began providing increased favours to non-Bumiputeras whom he believed could productively develop state-generated rents. He also stated that those businesses that performed well would benefit from further state patronage. Beneficiaries included Genting, YTL Corp and Tanjong. This support is one reason why a new set of non-Bumiputera firms emerged as prominent corporate players in spite of the strong emphasis on affirmative action for Malay enterprise development.
Mahathir and Daim did not remain benign patrons after dispensing state rents. They took an active part in directing the development of firms that received state rents. In some cases, it was difficult to ascertain if these firms were acting in the interests of their ostensible owners, UMNO or their patrons, specifically the business interests of Daim. Inevitably, it was alleged that UMNO had found, through affirmative action, a mechanism to implement policies, regulate markets and distribute rents to serve vested interests (Gomez, 1994 (Gomez, , 2006 . Even UMNO members criticised Daim for abusing his position to develop his corporate base. Daim's influence in government and business was a major reason for a deeply fractious UMNO election in 1987 that almost led to Mahathir's fall from power (Gomez, 1994) . UMNO subsequently splintered into two groups, with the losing faction allying itself with opposition parties to forge coalitions that were to seriously threaten to unseat the Barisan Nasional during the 1990 general election. In 1992, a year after he had stepped down as finance minister and Mahathir had consolidated his position in UMNO and the government, Daim's total wealth reportedly amounted to a billion ringgit, including assets in foreign countries.
As those who received state rents did so through connections and emerged remarkably swiftly through takeovers and asset-for-share swaps, critics argued that Mahathir's practice of selective patronage had hardly generated entrepreneurial dynamism among local firms (Gomez, 2006) . Apparently, well-connected companies had been imbued with the pursuit of profit over the cultivation of an entrepreneurial spirit (see Yoshihara, 1988) .
Mahathir, however, expected rentiers to follow the South Korean model and grow by exploiting existing technological knowledge and by developing the capacity to innovate. He encouraged rentiers to adopt a long-term view to enterprise development rather than seeing state concessions as a mechanism for quick returns that would help propel them into the league of the "new rich." Businesses receiving government rents had to face competition. This was most obvious in the telecommunications, financial, power, construction and property development sectors, suggesting an attempt by Mahathir to encourage entrepreneurship (Gomez, 2002) .
Among Malay-owned firms, however, few appeared to follow Mahathir's directive to develop technological expertise. One that did build on its founder's experience in the telecommunications industry was Sapura Holdings. This enterprise, led by Shamsuddin Kadir (who had long been in the employ of the government utility, Telecoms) emerged with a reputation for producing telecommunication units based on new technology developed through research (Gomez and Jomo, 1999: 72-5; Salazar, 2007: 170-71). Sapura, however, divested its interests in this sector, probably due to the use of mobile phones, a highly competitive sector developed by well-connected businesspeople including Tajudin Ramli, Vincent Tan and Ananda Krishnan (see Salazar, 2007) .
Among non-Malay firms, there were two examples of those that had productively developed rents secured from the state. The first was YTL Corp., which had no experience in power generation when it secured a lucrative independent power producer licence, but learnt the technology by working with the German company, Siemens, before developing a reputation on its own, even expanding its operations abroad (Gomez, 1999: 163-70 ). The second were the companies owned by Ananda Krishnan, who secured a number of state concessions in telecommunications, power supply and for the launch of a TV satellite. All these enterprises were developed in collaboration with foreign firms and by employing professionals with expertise in these sectors (Gomez and Jomo, 1999: 159-65) . By the end of the 1990s, Ananda was one of Malaysia's wealthiest businesspeople, second only to Robert Kuok, who could be said to represent "old capital."
Mahathir had come to realise the importance of Chinese -and foreign -capital for sustaining growth and promoting industrialisation following a severe recession in the mid1980s. He subsequently liberalised the economy and included Chinese capital in his development plans, albeit on his terms. In the early 1990s, Mahathir also saw the opening up of China's economy as potentially lucrative for Malaysian capital, and this led to his call for greater business co-operation between Chinese and Malays. 19 Mahathir urged Bumiputera businesses to work with the Chinese to enter the market in China; clearly, this was partly as a means to further promote Malay capital.
During the 1990s, the government had found it necessary to accommodate Chinese capital for political reasons. As UMNO factionalism became serious and as intra-ethnic divisions among Malays escalated -evidenced in the 1995 and 1999 general elections (see Welsh, 2004 : 130-56) -the BN found it imperative to court non-Bumiputera support. One avenue to secure Chinese support was to award rents to non-Malays, though the recipients were usually required to apportion some of these concessions to well-connected Bumiputeras. Inevitably, Mahathir's objective of creating a class of Bumiputera capitalists seemed to determine how Chinese businesses sought to cultivate Malay leaders and Chinese businesses that had operated independently of the state began to recognise the necessity for working with well-connected Malays. Medium-scale Chinese firms also began incorporating influential Malays as directors. This meant a growing number of Chinese companies began to depend less on institutions such as the MCA and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to secure access to state rents (see Gomez, 1999) .
It was the 1997 Asian currency crisis that unravelled Mahathir's plans to develop Malaysian entrepreneurs. The crisis adversely affected companies owned by many of the well-connected who found themselves holding corporate stock worth far less then their acquired value, leaving them severely over-leveraged. Between June 1997 and August 1998, non-performing loans (NPLs) held by domestic banks rose from RM9.3 billion to RM42.2 billion. The banks holding the most NPLs were government-owned: Sime Bank, Bank Bumiputra and Malayan Banking. Bank Bumiputra needed a capital injection of RM1.1 billion and the government bought its NPLs (Gomez and Jomo, 1999: 192-99) . Sime Bank, then controlled by Mahathir's former political secretary, declared huge losses and was subsequently taken over by the well-connected Rashid Hussain group.
In spite of Mahathir's scrutiny of these preferentially-selected and treated firms, there was little or no disciplining of them, probably because in some cases the ostensible owners did his bidding. The government bailed out several of these companies, sometimes at exorbitant prices, and took over major privatisation projects. The re-nationalisation of the controversial multi-billion ringgit Bakun Dam and national sewerage projects, and the government's decision to acquire control of major privatised enterprises such as the national airline, MAS, the telecommunications firm, Celcom, and the North-South Highway toll operator and construction firm, United Engineers (M) (UEM), were outstanding examples of costly mistakes. Interestingly, government-controlled companies listed on the stock exchange fared much better in the currency crisis than did these well-connected firms.
The reasoning behind much of this state assistance was dubious. When DRB-Hicom encountered financial problems following the currency crisis, its interests in Proton were bought by Petronas, the government's cash-rich oil agency, on the grounds that Malaysia's car industry had to be sustained. Even if this was the case, the restructuring of DRB-Hicom could have involved Chinese firms in the sector but Mahathir seemed reluctant, probably because Chinese auto firms had remained independent of the government.
Another factor contributed to the fall of a number of well-connected enterprises following the currency crisis. Since the rise of these businesses was linked to the patronage of influential politicians, their fortunes depended on whether their patrons remained in power. After a serious fall-out between Mahathir and his deputy, Anwar, the latter was removed from office in September 1998, allowing the prime minister to further concentrate power in his office. Most business leaders associated with Anwar subsequently struggled to protect their corporate interests; many of them are no longer prominent. Similarly, when Daim fell out of favour with Mahathir in 2001, the corporate assets owned by his business allies and proxies were taken over by GLCs (see Gomez, 2006) . It is Malay capitalists who have remained relatively independent of influential politicians who appear to have fared better since the crisis.
At the same time, the government has been able to take over corporate assets at will. Prominent businessmen such as Rashid Hussain, T.K. Lim and Tong Kooi Ong have lost control of large, even thriving, enterprises, because they were allied with ousted politicians or had lost favour with Mahathir (Gomez, 2006) . By 2003, in spite of the rise of huge firms, capitalists generally remained subservient to the state. This subordination of capital brought into question the sustainability of corporate enterprises, given the vulnerability of these companies to political power struggles.
However, among smaller quoted companies, in terms of market capitalisation, crucial changes transpired. During the 1990s, these smaller firms showed evidence of increasing inter-ethnic business ties. A study of ownership of firms listed on the bourse in 2000 indicates that only about 18 (or 2.5%) of them were inter-ethnic partnerships (Wazir, 2002) . This low 2.5% figure drew attention to the issue of the sustainability of partnerships. These firms, however, share some interesting features. All 18 were quoted on the stock exchange in the 1990s. Nearly 50% of these companies were incorporated or began operating as interethnically-owned firms during the 1980s and 1990s. Twelve (or 67%) of these 18 companies were involved in manufacturing, indicating a productive economic dimension to their business activities and the possible emergence of a new breed of entrepreneurs. Five (or 18%) of these enterprises were involved in the construction sector which suggests that some elements of an "Ali-Baba" relationship still prevailed among these newly-listed enterprises.
This evidence of inter-ethnic business ties demonstrates a transition in society that in turn suggests two things about affirmative action. First, NEP implementation has led to the creation of an independent, dynamic Bumiputera middle class (Abdul Rahman, 2001 ). Second, important changes in the way businesspeople developed their firms were evident. Changes in business strategies, organisational structure and management style within these firms suggest that new generations of Chinese and Malays, unlike their forebears, appeared more inclined to forge inter-ethnic corporate ties. These developments implied that there was a greater openness to inter-ethnic business co-operation for mutual benefit among this new generation suggest the possibility that non-Bumiputeras born and bred in Malaysia were comfortable about cultivating inter-ethnic relationships. Among middle-class Bumiputeras, there was an increased confidence and ability to hold their own in business, having acquired skills through affirmative action. This growing evidence of inter-ethnic business ties among quoted companies, without state intervention, raises important questions about the need to remove ethnicity as a social marker when assigning ownership and control of resources.
Before he retired, Mahathir provided a candid assessment of his failed policy endeavours, as well as the lessons learned. NEP patronage, he admitted, had led to a "crutch mentality" and he felt that the only way to promote Bumiputera entrepreneurship was to expose these businesses to competition (Mahathir, 2002) . The Chinese, he added, had managed to increase their ownership of corporate equity because they had been forced to compete especially hard during the implementation of affirmative action (Mahathir, 2002) . What Mahathir did not mention was that the Chinese businesspeople of Malaysia, for all their ostensible entrepreneurship, had not managed to develop brand names or move up the technological ladder. This stalled technological ascendancy on the part of non-Bumiputera firms was mainly due to inadequate support from Mahathir's government (see Gomez, 1999) .
By 2001, no Bumiputera had ownership of a top ten quoted firms (see Appendix 3). Well-connected Malays, such as Halim Saad and Tajudin Ramli, whose companies had secured a high ranking on the Bursa Malaysia before the currency crisis were no longer listed. Significantly, the government had majority ownership of six of the top ten firms, due to the partial nature of some of the privatisations. These firms included the former public utilities Telekom Malaysia and Tenaga Nasional, the leading bank, Malayan Banking, Petronas Gas, the national shipping line MISC, and Sime Darby. 20 The government also had a stake in Commerce Asset-Holding, which owns the second largest bank, Bumiputra Commerce Bank, a merger between state-owned Bank Bumiputra and Bank of Commerce, owned by UMNO. Two well-connected groups, Renong and NSTP, similarly own a huge interest in Commerce Asset-Holding. In July 2001, the government announced a takeover of Renong (see below).
The other three firms in the top ten -Resorts World, Genting and YTL Corporationare Chinese-owned. Genting and Resorts World involved in the casino and leisure industries, and are part of the same group owned by Lim Goh Tong. The YTL group, involved in the construction, property development and power industries, is owned by Yeoh Tiong Lay and his family (see Gomez, 1999) . The other conspicuous point about this top ten was that none of them was owned by a foreign enterprise.
Of the companies ranked from 11 to 20, five were Chinese-owned: Public Bank owned by Teh Hong Piow, YTL Power International, which is part of the YTL Group, the gaming firms, Berjaya Sports Toto, controlled by Vincent Tan, and Magnum Corporation, which is part of the Multi-Purpose Holdings (MPHB) group, and Kuala Lumpur-Kepong (KLK), owned by the Lee family. Only one government-owned firm and one foreign-owned company figured in the 11-20 bracket, that is the motor vehicle producer, Proton, and the cigarette producer Rothmans of Pall Mall, respectively. Three Malays were owners of firms in the 11-20 bracket -RHB Capital, part of the financial-based RHB Group and once controlled by Rashid Hussain, United Engineers (UEM) and Renong. Renong and UEM have cross-holdings, with the former functioning as the main holding company of this highlydiversified group. This meant that by mid-2001, of the top 20 companies, only one -RHB Capital -was owned by a Bumiputera. In 2002, Rashid divested control of RHB Bank following a merger of this enterprise with Bank Utama, an institution wholly-owned by the Utama Banking group, controlled by publicly-quoted Cahya Mata Sarawak, an enterprise in which family members of Taib Mahmud, the chief minister of the state of Sarawak, have a major interest.
The top 20 firms indicate several important features. First, the decline of foreign ownership between 1970 and 2000; only one of the top 20 firms was owned by a foreign enterprise. Second, in spite of an active privatisation programme since the mid-1980s, the government still had majority ownership of half of the top 20 firms. Of these ten companies, two were formerly part of the Renong group, a major recipient of privatised rents, while Proton was re-nationalised. Third, eight of the top 20 firms were Chinese-owned, indicating that members of this ethnic community had managed to maintain a strong presence in the economy even with NEP. Fourth, only one major company was owned by a well-connected Bumiputera family. One key sector where the influence of non-Bumputeras had diminished and the role of GLCs and Bumiputera individuals had increased was in banking. The decline in non-Malay participation in this sector was a result of the government's controversial bank consolidation exercise. In 1999, the government proposed to merge Malaysia's 58 financial institutions into ten anchor banks. One key criticism of this exercise was that the most dynamic banks were being brought under the control of less entrepreneurial institutions (Gomez, 2006) . When the original proposal for just six banks was presented, there was open discontent among nonBumiputera bankers who considered that this consolidation would diminish their presence in this sector. The number of Chinese-owned banks was subsequently increased from two (Public Bank and Southern Bank) to three, when Hong Leong Bank was also given anchor bank status. The government has majority ownership of four of the ten anchor banks. Another two are owned by Bumiputeras. The non-Malays' prominent presence in banking and finance was considerably diminished through government directive (see Gomez, 2006 : 119-46; Rubi and Sieh-Lee, 2000: 235-64).The government's dominance of the banking sector can be detrimental to industrial capital as businesses will be extremely dependent on the state for long-term investment, a situation that is of concern given that policy tends to be determined along ethnic lines.
A While the studies by Lim (1981), Tan (1982), Sieh-Lee (1982) and Mehmet (1986) had revealed that interlocking ownership and directorships were important in ownership and control patterns of the corporate sector during the 1970s and 1980s, this was not the case by the end of the century. An analysis of interlocking stock ownership patterns revealed no links between the top 100 firms that suggested monopolisation of economic sectors. A number of these quoted firms did, however, come under the umbrella of one holding company or were controlled by one businessman. 21 This form of grouping, involving the use of a holding company -and, in some cases, cross-holdings and pyramiding -reflects the most important form of corporate control. This corporate grouping pattern also indicates the conglomeratestyle growth adopted by a number of Malaysian businesspeople.
One important feature of corporate Malaysia in 2001 was the prominence of family firms (see Appendix 3). Families were reputed to control about 40% of publicly-listed firms, with the top ten families owning a quarter of market capitalisation. As noted, among the top 10 listed firms, three are family-controlled (Genting/Resorts World and YTL Corp), though other major family firms include Perlis Plantations (Kuok family), KLK (Lee family) and Tan Chong (Tan family). 22 The founders of most of these family firms retain control of these companies. Among the quoted firms still led by their founders are Public Bank (Teh Hong Piow), Lion Group (William Cheng), Berjaya Group (Vincent Tan), IOI (Lee Shin Cheng), AMMB Holdings (Azman Hashim); Tanjong/Maxis (Ananda Krishnan), Jaya Tiasa (Tiong Hiew King); MUI (Khoo Kay Peng) and Country Heights (Lee Kim Yew).
A review of the activities of the top companies in 2001 shows that none is involved in new technologies or in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, electronics and computers. This is a point of concern given Chandler's contention that an economy's growth is dependent not merely on its natural resources, labour and managerial skills, available capital and size of internal markets, but more on how its technologies are organised and developed (Chandler, 1997: 63) . 23 
THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE, ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The Malaysian state's attempt to selectively cultivate firms to drive industrialisation and promote domestic enterprise is not unique. In the US, the government adhered to the argument by Alexander Hamilton that during the economy's catching-up phase, it had to nurture and protect infant industries, which led to the emergence of a vast industrial base of firms, many with the capacity to compete internationally. In Germany, the government created and nurtured a strong domestic business sector that had a symbiotic relationship with the state. Nineteenth century political economist Friedrich List laid emphasis on the importance of industry and advocated systematic, but temporary, protection for Germany's infant industries. A similar pattern of state-business collusion occurred in late nineteenth century Japan where the government built its own factories in key industries in an attempt to catch up with the West. These factories were subsequently sold by the state to favoured private businesses at low rates, with Mitsui and Mitsubishi developed through such state patronage. This system of patronage was again promoted after 1945 to rebuild the economy (Johnson, 1982) . Similar state-capital linkages involving a focus on priority sectors todrive industrialisation, promote domestic capital and bring about structural change, including reducing poverty, have occurred in South Korea and Taiwan (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990) .
While the US, German and East Asian economies now have thriving industrial bases, in Malaysia, the state's developmentalism with neo-liberal policies has had serious economic repercussions, while its attempt to create Bumiputera entrepreneurial firms, especially in the industrial sector, has failed. A number of reasons account for these failures. First, selective patronage was not exercised in a transparent manner with the primary criteria being the need to "pick winners" in a particular sector. The state provided a variety of reasons for not exercising transparency during the disbursement of rents, including the need to expedite industrialisation, advance domestic capital and ensure ethnic co-existence through an equitable distribution of the wealth generated. However, the state's stress on targeting firms for selective patronage along ethnic lines tempered its choice of the "winners," while the need to channel these rents to businesspeople aligned to government leaders suggested an abuse of affirmative action. Meanwhile, according preferential treatment to one community, at least during the early years when the state began its pursuit of heavy industrialisation, undermined the development of domestic firms.
And, unlike Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, but similar to other more developed Southeast Asian economies, Malaysia heavily cultivated foreign capital to drive industrialisation. In Malaysia's case, this was to ensure that Chinese-owned capital did not secure ascendancy in the economy and to provide the state with time to cultivate Malay entrepreneurs. The form of governance, specifically the repercussions of executive hegemony in government as well as UMNO's dominance over other parties in the Barisan Nasional, led to unproductive political-business ties, also contributed to the state's failure to develop large, Malay-owned firms.
For all Mahathir's emphasis on Japan, it was the Korean model that he most adhered to, along with his belief that ideas within this model could be mixed with the tenets of neoliberalism. A comparison of the outcomes of the Korean and Malaysian states' developmentalist drive is thus instructive. In South Korea, economic and corporate development from the early 1960s had three primary features: a strong authoritarian state with centralised agencies in charge of economic and industrial policy formulation, implementation and supervision; a state-controlled financial system providing "policy loans" at favourable rates, together with policy guidance to selected sectors, industries and companies; and big, private, industrial chaebols, with aggressive and diversified investment policies, developed through state concessions (Amsden, 1989) . There eventually evolved several hundred chaebols and, by 1997, almost 80% of South Korea's GNP was generated by about 30 family-owned chaebols. Family ownership remains important among the chaebols, usually through a holding company. Most chaebols continue to be dominated by authoritarian entrepreneurial figures and family members, although salaried managers are increasingly common. Capital has come predominantly from bank borrowings, much of it from stateowned banks, granted on the condition that the chaebol was expanding into governmentsanctioned industrial and export-based industries. The chaebols' principal goal was rapid growth, as size, measured by volume of sales, was the crucial factor in influencing the state and in competition with other chaebols. Management and decision-making tend to be centralised. Since competition between the chaebols was intense, there was little interindustry co-operation (Wad, 2002) .
A common feature among the leading privately-owned large enterprises in South Korea and Malaysia is that they are under the control of one founder or family. In Korea, diversification would take the form of the creation of new firms, often partly owned by and linked to the original parent, but separate from a legal point of view and themselves specialised in whatever they do. In Malaysia, some large companies similarly attempted to do both, that is master expertise in technology and still remain quite diversified. The operations of firms in the Hong Leong group best reflect this -each sector the conglomerate is involved in is under a holding company that is independently and professionally run. Professional managers in charge of these different holding companies report to the chairman. Another businessman exercising this pattern of corporate holding and management is Ananda Krishnan. A semblance of this form of management is also prevalent in YTL Corp. The organisational capabilities and administrative coordination, involving decentralisation of decision-making to a professional management, demonstrated by these Malaysian firms explain their capacity to develop a diversified enterprise, where a number of others have failed.
It is obvious that a number of well-connected and preferentially-treated Malaysian firms develop business strategies heavily influenced by their access to finance, from banks as well as the stock market; this factor has eventually worked to their detriment. In Japan, companies developed with banks an interlocking ownership relationship that aided the implementation of long-term business strategies (Dore, 2000) . This pattern, which drove industrial growth in Japan, was not replicated in Malaysia even though a large proportion of loans came from state-owned banks. Moreover, the state did not monitor these loans, nor was there sufficient regulation to ensure that banks disbursed loans in a fashion that conformed with the dictates of government policies.
While the firms selectively patronised in South Korea demonstrated entrepreneurialism and developed export capacity, Malaysian preferentially selected companies have not. And, unlike Korea and Japan, Malaysian firms incorporated to develop heavy industries have failed miserably, with only the car industry still under local (state) control, though a joint-venture with a foreign enterprise has long been proposed. Interestingly, there is still no government review of Chinese-owned motor vehicle assemblers and distributors to involve them in the national car project. As noted above, their inclusion could have led to the development of an entrepreneurial firm with export capacity. Ominously, Chinese firms in this sector appear to be losing out to foreign companies. Oriental Holdings lost its sole distributor rights of Honda model vehicles in 2001. A new joint-venture, DRB-Oriental-Honda, was formed in which Oriental Holdings has only a 15% stake. Honda holds a 49% stake and DRB-Hicom holds 36%. Oriental Holdings has linked up with Korea's Hyundai Motor Company to distribute their vehicles in Malaysia. Tan Chong Motor remains the sole distributor of Nissan model motor vehicles, although it seems that Nissan is increasing its local equity in the region. 24 While the development of the motor vehicle sector was linked to BCIC, using the vendor system to promote the rise of Bumiputera-owned SMEs in the manufacturing sector, this too has failed to achieve its objective (Leutert and Sudhoff, 1999) . The government's failures in manufacturing bring into question the effectiveness of "targeting." It seems that the reasons for this failure have to do with the state's resistance to incorporating firms or people who already had expertise in the industry, probably due to political and ethnic policies. Furthermore, Malaysian firms have fared poorly in terms of their investment in research and development. 25 While the state-business linkages created in Korea and Japan to develop entrepreneurial firms facilitated the rise of internationally recognised companies, such ties have not been as successful in Malaysia. Some companies with state patronage have emerged as enterprises with foreign business ventures, including the gaming firm, Genting, financial services provider, Public Bank, and Malayan United Industries (MUI), as well as the business groups owned by Kuok, Quek, Ananda, Yeoh, Tan and Cheng. The failure of local enterprises supported by the Malaysian state to internationalise can be attributed to a host of factors including lax supervision of the financial sector and an unsustainable form of corporate growth through debt, as well as cronyism, corruption and nepotism (see Gomez, 1990 Gomez, , 1991 Gomez, , 1994 Gomez, , 2002 Searle, 1999; Yoshihara, 1988) .
That the leading Bumiputera firms are GLCs, in spite of privatisation and affirmative action, is an indication of the parlous state of privately-owned Malay capital. The nonexistence of Bumiputeras in quoted manufacturing firms raises questions about the BCIC's capacity to cultivate large and competitive enterprises. It is doubtful that the GLCs possess entrepreneurial capacity; growth through acquisition, mergers and takeovers is hardly entrepreneurial. GLCs can, however, be placed under the control of competent managers, leading to their rise as professionally-managed firms with expertise in particular sectors. Although government leaders had long felt that GLCs could have entrepreneurial capacity, these firms have not shown the ability to deal with the MNCs with whom joint ventures in heavy industries were created. One lesson from the involvement of these GLCs in joint ventures was that they appeared concerned only with advancing industrialisation, not developing entrepreneurial capacity. An attempt to promote managerial capitalism, in the Chandlerian tradition, would enhance the capacity of the GLCs to function far more productively in the economy (see Chandler, 1977) .
Another factor contributing to the limited number of large industrial firms includes the pattern of growth of these enterprises, involving conglomerate-style acquisitions and an over-dependence on loans to expand. The emergence of a diversified pattern of growth through loans can be attributed to state policies, specifically those dealing with the control and use of the financial sector to promote corporate expansion. This pattern became a popular strategy among large firms due to the desire of businesspeople to venture into any field that promised quick profits or had potentially strong consumer demand. A problem with firms adopting this pattern was the considerable over-diversification of their corporate base. The core businesses of a number of businesspeople who adopted this pattern, including Halim Saad, Tajudin Ramli, Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah, Mirzan Mahathir, Vincent Tan and William Cheng, were severely impaired by the currency crisis. In addition, their dependence on shortterm loans and foreign portfolio investments to fund their diversification drive caused them problems during the crisis. This suggests the business style of many of these firms and the manner of their growth -whether a vertical, horizontal or diversified pattern was employedappear to be factors determining their capacity to deal with economic crises.
Apart from ownership patterns, an important feature of the top 100 publicly-listed firms in 2001 was that barely 20 of them list manufacturing as their primary activity. A majority of them are foreign-owned -Rothmans, Nestle, Malayan Cement, Carlsberg, Guinness Anchor, RJ Reynolds, Malaysian Oxygen, Kedah Cement and Shell Refining Company (see Gomez, 2006 ). This pattern indicates that, with one possible exception, the colonial-era manufacturing companies have not managed to grow (Puthucheary, 1960; SiehLee, 1982) . The exception are the three firms of the Hong Leong group -Malaysian Pacific Industries (MPI), which is involved in the electronics sector, OYL Industries, producer of airconditioning products, and Hong Leong Industries, a tiles manufacturer. As was also the case at Independence, most of the domestic manufacturing firms in the top 100 are Chineseowned. A comparison of Lim's (1981) compilation of the top 100 companies in 1970 with that of the leading firms in 2001 indicates that only one enterprise has managed to retain its position as a leading manufacturer, the foreign-owned Rothmans. 26 This suggests that manufacturing firms of old have failed to invest in new plant and equipment, introduce new products or pursue new markets.
Other reasons can be identified for the rise of a mere handful of large entrepreneurial firms in Malaysia. In his study of the decline of big British firms between 1880 and 1940 in a number of capital-intensive industries, Chandler (1990) attributed this decline to a failure to invest sufficiently in production, distribution and organisation. This failure might also account for the demise of some colonial-era Malayan enterprises, but more research is required to confirm this.
The limited presence of large firms manufacturing can also be attributed to the NEP. Since NEP-related policies such as the 1975 Industrial Coordination Act (see Jesudason, 1989 ) discouraged Chinese manufacturing businesses, SMEs which had the capacity to develop new technology have been constrained from fostering domestically-driven industrialisation.
Targeting Bumiputera capital has in large measure been unsuccessful. The decline of a number of large Malay firms in the post-1997 period suggests that selective intervention has failed, though not because of inadequate state support. Property rights is important because the emergence of a strong state. And, in the presence of a strong state, it appears to have been imperative for capitalists to link up with influential politicians. However, the politics of the state, specifically that involving UMNO, has overwhelmed and undermined the independent functioning of the corporate sector. State policies and legislation can be used to remove assets owned by businessmen who appear to not conform to the interests of government leaders (Gomez 2002) .
One major reason why large industrial firms failed to evolve was that UMNO was overly concerned to ensure that the Chinese did not enhance their corporate ownership and control. The government need not have feared Chinese economic dominance. Several studies reveal that common ethnic identity has not served to unify members of this community nor was it the crucial factor that contributed to the sustained presence of Chinese-owned capital (see Jesudason, 1989; Searle, 1999; Gomez, 1999 Gomez, , 2004 . The diversity of size, type of ownership and management, and areas of business, explains why Chinese firms seldom cooperate with each other. Most Chinese owners of companies are reluctant to merge with other firms, for to do so would mean sharing control of the enlarged enterprise, when the desire is to go it alone. Likewise, common Malay identity has not served to unify Malay businesses, including those owned by businesspeople who shared the same political patron (Sloane, 1999) . It has been demonstrated that the long promotion of affirmative action that discriminated against Chinese enterprises generated intra-ethnic business competition, not cooperation (Gomez, 1999; 2004) .
CONCLUSION: WHAT HISTORY SHOWS
A key point of this review of corporate Malaysia's history is that no firm in the top 20 in 1957, or in 1970, has managed to retain its position in 2007, raising questions about the sustainability of big business and drawing attention to three crucial issues: first, the impact of state intervention and policies on local enterprise. Second, the strategies adopted by businesses, which have been heavily conditioned by state policies, though the pattern of growth and form of management of an enterprise do matter in determining its longevity and sustainability. Third, the state's use of its power in its different manifestations and its effect on economic and enterprise development. The state has operated at multiple levels in the economy -through GLCs, UMNO, a hegemonic executive and influential politicians -each attempting to promote the interests of particular companies. These different manifestations of the state have, in most instances, undermined policy implementation and influenced patterns of enterprise development, frequently to the detriment of private firms.
While the state under Mahathir cannot be faulted for not attempting to formulate effective, even visionary, macro-and micro-economic policies, its "mix-and-match" approach to enterprise development has had serious repercussions on the corporate sector and the economy. The industrial sector has failed to flourish in spite of extensive state support; SMEs have not thrived for lack of attention; the economy remains dependent on foreign firms, seen in the latter's control of the country's leading industrial firms; domestic Malay entrepreneurship in large firms is negligible, with many of the so-called captains of industry of the 1990s having fallen away; and none of the Malays groomed by Mahathir, Anwar and Daim retain control of any major enterprise.
The political context, where the state had bypassed a thriving domestic entrepreneurial group in favour of cultivating a new group of businesspeople from one particular ethnic group, has not served to develop independent domestic enterprise. Much of Malaysia's corporate equity is under state control, through its GLCs which have come to occupy their prominent position by default rather than by design (through government policy). It is ironic that the GLCs' important corporate sector role can be partly attributed to the state's failure to develop large Malay-owned firms. Given the executive's hegemony over the state, corporate power is now in the hands of the prime minister, via his control of the GLCs. 27 Interestingly, most companies that have long remained under state control have emerged as fairly professionally-managed firms, with a sense of stability not evident in wellconnected enterprises. These outcomes suggest the need for policies based on merit, with a review of preferential support for Bumiputeras and reinforcement of the BCIC. This history shows that domestic firms had garnered manufacturing experience during the colonial era and that this development has stalled. While the government failed to nurture this entrepreneurial capacity, its policies have undermined these enterprises. Even though non-Malay companies retain a prominent presence in the economy in spite of affirmative action, most have not developed the capacity to move up the technological ladder. Inadequate state support of entrepreneurial industry serves to further constrain the rise of a domestic capital that could reduce Malaysia's dependence on foreign companies for industrialisation.
The government needs to re-think its ethnic policies in the business sector. UMNO remains convinced that Chinese culture and ethnicity are factors that have contributed to the rise of Chinese-owned firms, explaining also why they remain a major economic force. The fact is that common Chinese ethnicity has not led to co-operative corporate ties for mutual benefit. There is no evidence of a concentration of capital among ethnic Chinese capitalistsa point made by Puthucheary (1960: xix) for Chinese firms during the colonial period -nor do they consider the plight of the community before making commercial decisions. The government should recognise that when, for a short period, it managed to create prominent Malay-owned businesses, decision-making within these enterprises was not conditioned by considerations regarding Bumiputera welfare, unless this was dictated by the state (Sloane, 1999) .
This study confirms that no one single model of enterprise development can be seen as an ideal type. A variety of factors have contributed to a firm's rise, including entrepreneurial ability, management and organisational capabilities, ownership and control patterns (as well as the outcome of its changing forms) and manner of enterprise development. Some important lessons learnt include the need to develop expertise and to grow organically rather than to rely too extensively on loans to expand. The reasons for the fall of large firms are varied, comprising factors not pertaining to entrepreneurial failure. The capture of state-created rents by the well-connected without the requisite business skills was obviously a reason for the rapid rise and fall of large firms. In other cases, succession problems and feuds within a family firm have contributed to the loss of control of an enterprise, or even its demise. The overwhelming presence of UMNO leaders in the corporate sector, and rivalries between them, have led to the departure of prominent businesspeople, as well as the fall of leading firms.
While this study has managed to synthesise much of the history of big business, more research is required of the varieties of capital -SMEs, GLCs and foreign firms -that exist in Malaysia. When identifying mechanisms to encourage domestic firms in the industrial sector, the government should be aware of the diversity of production systems that exist, the stages of growth that a firm would require (or could bypass) to develop technological skills, and the support that would benefit these companies during these points of development. This could contribute to a better understanding of the entrepreneurial and state dynamism that characterises the economies of industrialised East Asia, but is yet to be emulated in Malaysia. 3 See also Berle and Means (1967) , the primary proponents of the concept of ownership and control. 4 See Teece (1993) for a perceptive review of Chandler's Scale and Scope. 5 As questions were raised about the efficacy of large firms, the growing argument in the 1980s was for the need for greater decentralisation of such companies, a point that will be referred to here in an analysis of the more entrepreneurial firms in Malaysia. 6 Mahathir appeared more enthusiastic about the family-controlled zaibatsu system than the inter-locking stock ownership keiretsu pattern of corporate development, where corporate equity was very widely disbursed. The zaibatsu system would evolve into the keiretsu mode of corporate holding after World War II (see Morck and Masao, 2003) . Following numerous exposes about the government's award of this lucrative contract as well as other rents to firms owned by the ruling party, ownership was passed to private individuals associated with government leaders, such as Halim Saad and Tajudin Ramli (see Gomez, 1990 Gomez, , 1991 Gomez, and 1994 . 19 At the 1996 Second Fujianese World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention, Mahathir was quoted as saying, "Malaysian Fujianese's close connections with their fellow-provincials in different corners of the world will help promote the business and investment opportunities in Malaysia" (quoted in Liu 1998). 20 The main government enterprises that own a stake in Telekom Malaysia and Tenaga Nasional include Khazanah Nasional and the Minister of Finance Inc., while the controlling shareholder of Malayan Banking and Sime Darby is the national trust agency, PNB. MISC is majority-owned by Petronas, which also owns Petronas Gas. 21 The holding company structure exists whenever one parent or holding company controls the composition of the board of directors, or controls more than half the voting power, or holds more than half of the issued share capital of another subsidiary company. This definition is extended to include a company which is a subsidiary of a subsidiary. The holding company uses the system of pyramiding, which allows the owner to maintain control over corporations with a relatively small investment. See Sieh- Lee (1982: 45) and Lim (1981: 6) for a more in-depth discussion of the holding company structure. 22 There remains little research on the volume and contribution of family firms to the Malaysian economy, an important issue as research on family firms worldwide indicates that almost 70% fail to survive into the second generation. Of those that do, almost 50% do not make the transition from the second to the third generation.
